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By combining incident learning and process failure-mode-and-effects-analysis (FMEA) in
a structure-process-outcome framework we have created a risk profile for our radiation
medicine practice and implemented evidence-based risk-mitigation initiatives focused
on patient safety. Based on reactive reviews of incidents reported in our departmental
incident-reporting system and proactive FMEA, high safety-risk procedures in our paper-
less radiation medicine process and latent risk factors were identified. Six initiatives aimed
at the mitigation of associated severity, likelihood-of-occurrence, and detectability risks
were implemented.These were the standardization of care pathways and toxicity grading,
pre-treatment-planning peer review, a policy to thwart delay-rushed processes, an elec-
tronic whiteboard to enhance coordination, and the use of six sigma metrics to monitor
operational efficiencies. The effectiveness of these initiatives over a 3-years period was
assessed using process and outcome specific metrics within the framework of the depart-
ment structure. There has been a 47% increase in incident-reporting, with no increase in
adverse events. Care pathways have been used with greater than 97% clinical compli-
ance rate. The implementation of peer review prior to treatment-planning and use of the
whiteboard have provided opportunities for proactive detection and correction of errors.
There has been a twofold drop in the occurrence of high-risk procedural delays. Patient
treatment start delays are routinely enforced on cases that would have historically been
rushed. Z -scores for high-risk procedures have steadily improved from 1.78 to 2.35. The
initiatives resulted in sustained reductions of failure-mode risks as measured by a set of
evidence-based metrics over a 3-years period. These augment or incorporate many of the
published recommendations for patient safety in radiation medicine by translating them to
clinical practice.
Keywords: incident learning, failure-mode-and-effects-analysis, root cause analysis, patient safety, no-fly-policy, six
sigma, electronic whiteboard
INTRODUCTION
The preparation of a treatment plan for delivery of radiation ther-
apy to a patient requires several process steps and checks spread
over about a week with interactions and handoffs between a het-
erogeneous set of caregivers, hardware, and software interfaces.
Thus pathways for errors to propagate toward an unsafe event for
any patient are multifold. Yet the rate of serious or adverse errors
in radiation therapy is estimated to be around 0.2% per patient
(1–4). While comparable to serious error rates in chemotherapy
(5), a field that is technologically less complex than radiotherapy,
the adverse error rates in radiation medicine are less favorable
than those in blood transfusion and anesthesiology (3), or in avi-
ation (6) – an industry that is cognate with radiation therapy in
its hierarchical organizational structures and reliance on complex
machinery. Thus while serious error rates are low, benchmarks
suggest we could do better in radiation medicine.
Recommendations to do better in this regard are typically sum-
marized in reports published by radiotherapy quality and safety
organizations worldwide. A recent study of seven such reports
from influential radiation therapy safety organizations worldwide
yielded 117 recommendations, 61 one of which were deemed
to be unique (7). Most reports with the possible exception of
one were based on expert opinion rather than evidence. Twelve
pertinent topics appeared in more than three of these reports.
These were training, staffing, documentation, standard-operating-
procedures, incident learning, communication, checklists, quality
control, preventive maintenance, dosimetric audits, accreditation,
minimizing interruptions, prospective risk assessments, and safety
culture. While such recommendations are clearly valuable, the
message to translate them uniformly, effectively, and efficiently
to clinical practice in multiple departments appears nebulous as
this study highlights.
There appears to be only modest improvement in error rates in
medicine in general where similar broad recommendations may
have been made (8,9). In one study with 10 US based hospitals cho-
sen on the basis of patient safety activities no significant reduction
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in overall rates of harm or preventable harm was reported (10),
while in another, a substantial percentage of patients from tertiary
care hospitals recognized for their efforts in patient safety received
harm (11). On the contrary, substantial improvements have been
noted where specific evidence-based approaches were used, such
as with the prevention of central venous catheter bloodstream
infections or reductions in mortality rates in anesthesiology (9).
Focused assessments of patient safety outcomes targeted by spe-
cific evidence-based interventions and metrics may therefore be a
useful complement to translate such recommendations to effective
practice (9, 12).
In spite of having implemented many of these traditional rec-
ommendations, quantitative analysis of the metadata from our
electronic medical records (EMR) or event-reporting database
in our radiation medicine department suggested we were at a
substantially higher risk than we would have perceived (13). Rec-
ognizing that not all poor processes lead to poor outcomes, and
some good processes may lead to poor outcomes (14) particu-
larly in an environment where some risk prone behavior is not
discouraged, our approach was to develop a quality management
(QM) framework that integrated the structure-process-outcomes
approach put forth by Donabedian (15–17), knowledge of vari-
ations in clinical practice using the Deming approach (18) and
event-reporting based on Codman principles (19). In order to
incorporate this framework, we utilized systems engineering tools
such as those used in high reliability industrial organizations and
applied these to our practice (13).
In this work we reviewed incidents reported in our Aspects-
of-Care (AOC) incident-reporting database to extract causes and
contributory factors for known failures (20) and conducted a
Failure-Mode-and-Effects-Analysis (FMEA) on our process-map
(21) to predict hypothetical effects relative to patient safety. The
rationale for either approach per se is that for every effect there
must be a set of causes and for every cause there must be some
set of effects (22). Based on the combined approach, we developed
and implemented six initiatives for risk-mitigation with specific
evidence-based metrics for evaluation that were both process and
outcomes based (23, 24). We report on the sustained impact of
these initiatives since these were implemented over the past few
years at our facility.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
DEPARTMENT STRUCTURE
Our department of Radiation Medicine is spread across the New
York metropolitan area over five sites within a major healthcare
system. The sites that provide radiation therapy are characterized
by a blend of academic,private,and community-practice traits that
may be representative to some extent,of a range of practice cultures
in many other departments in the country. We treat over 2000 new
patients each year with external beam radiation and brachyther-
apy utilizing eight linear accelerators and three high-dose-rate
brachytherapy systems. Our operations are paperless, driven by
quality checklists (QCLs) in our EMR and policies and procedures
that are updated regularly. Internal and external dosimetric audits
and reviews of our programs are conducted regularly by various
accreditation agencies. Our QM program encompasses all aspects
of patient care using the AOC database as a catchment framework
for the registry and analysis of events that represent departures
from standard operations or expected patient outcomes.
INCIDENT-REPORTING AND LEARNING SYSTEM (AOC DATABASE)
The AOC database is electronically available to all staff members
with an anonymous reporting option. Incidents are reported with
a brief narrative and associated reporting elements. The events are
reviewed weekly by a multidisciplinary QM team and reported
department and health-system wide on monthly and quarterly
bases. The taxonomy for analysis of events evolved historically
from a drop-down menu with shorthand notations for typical
causes prior to 2010 to a more structured and recursive approach
that mapped patient effects with underlying structure-process ele-
ments. The primary reason for the change was the observation
that reviews of the incidents were being overwhelmingly attrib-
uted to just a handful of causes. A focused independent review of
these however revealed that the causes typically picked were more
the result of deeper issues not being considered. Thus efforts to
make changes until then were not directed at the correct underly-
ing issues, rendering our reporting system ineffective. The changes
in the database taxonomy in 2010 thus allowed for more compre-
hensive analyses. Events are broken down into the observed patient
effect (19) and the underlying structure-process factors that may
have contributed to its occurrence. Patient effects include treat-
ment delays, treatment-planning delays, treatment interruptions,
patients not starting treatment, patients not completing treat-
ments, morbidity (grade 3 or higher), mortality, preventive safety
events (inclusive of near misses), and reactive safety events (inclu-
sive of variances). The taxonomy evolved using validation studies
that demonstrated improvements in the consistency of indepen-
dent analysis by various members of the QM team as measured
using free-marginal kappa statistics (25). These included ran-
domly selected events that analyzers independently categorized.
There have been over 2600 reports logged and analyzed since its
initial use in 2007.
FAILURE-MODE-AND-EFFECT-ANALYSIS
Given the cascaded steps and handoffs evident in the radiation
medicine process, our goal was to reorganize the chronologically
arranged process-map into one that was risk-sorted for patient
safety. The QCL process-map (QPM) in use at our facility and
similar to others (1, 26) was cast in the framework of an FMEA
spreadsheet with explicit procedural definitions. Our FMEA was
based on the electronic process-map driven by the QCLs in the
EMR. Thus metadata from the EMR to estimate likelihood-of-
occurrence risks over any interrogated time period was potentially
available.
The exercise was conducted by 15 staff members across the
various functional groups in the department including radiation
oncologists, physicists, dosimetrists, nurses, therapists, and one
non-clinical observer. There were two to four participants in each
functional group bracketing the hierarchical spread within. The
participants were asked to scrutinize the process-map, prospec-
tively consider various modes of failure for each step and list
their causes and safety consequences. In addition to individual
experience, the AOC database, group discussions, and other event-
reporting databases or publications (27–29) served as guidelines.
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Events in the AOC database were considered for alternate poten-
tial manifestations regardless of reported impact. Independent
responses were amalgamated after a 2-weeks response period.
Risk-scoring guides were established for the three components of
risk – severity, likelihood-of-occurrence, and detectability using
logarithmic scales (Table 1). Similar scales have been used by oth-
ers. The master spreadsheet was sent to the participants to grade
each failure-mode listed in the three risk components, following
clarification of the grading scheme, and collective walkthroughs
of sample failure-modes. Responses were obtained within 2 weeks
and discussed with the team. Average scores for each failure-mode
were computed. The consistency of grades assigned by various
participants was evaluated using kappa statistics. A risk priority
number (RPN) was computed as the product of the three risk
elements for each of the failure-modes.
DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION OF RISK-MITIGATION INITIATIVES
Given the observed (AOC) and predicted (FMEA) propensity
for either delays or defects in high-risk procedures, mitigation
strategies were developed to reduce their severity, likelihood-
of-occurrence, and detectability risks. The AOC findings were
scrutinized to seek evidence for resident pathogens – or latent
error-provoking conditions in the clinic and to ascertain if these
had any bearing on the performance of the high-risk procedures
(30, 31). Staffing, training, and equipment QM were deemed
adequate based on external audits by accreditation agencies. Ini-
tiatives that would confer robustness in our system in regard to the
pathogens regardless of violations or variability were sought (18,
30). Metrics to gage effectiveness of the initiatives, both in terms
of specific outcomes and specific processes, were developed and
reported to the department and health-system on a regular basis.
RESULTS
INCIDENT-REPORTING AND LEARNING SYSTEM
Incident-reporting increased by 47% following the AOC database
restructure in 2010. There was significant variation in reporting by
functional group: therapists (62.9%), nurses (26.7%), dosimetrists
(6.4%), physicists (1.5%), support staff (1.2%), anonymous
(0.9%), and radiation oncologists (0.4%). About 89.6% of the
reports were logged by therapists and nurses while 8.3% were
logged by the treatment-planning team. A high level of inter-
rater agreement (free-marginal multi-rater kappa score of 0.837)
was noted amongst QM team members who routinely analyzed
incident reports.
Patient effects reported included treatment delays (25.2%),
treatment-planning delays (20.9%), incomplete treatments
(14.5%), safety: preventive incidents (12.8%), treatment interrup-
tions (6.9%), safety: reactive incidents (6.7%), mortality (5.3%),
patients not starting treatment (4.2%), and morbidity (3.5%).
Patient treatment-planning or initiation delays and safety inci-
dents (preventive and reactive) comprised 65.6% of the reports in
the AOC database. Under-reporting of treatment-planning delays
by the treatment-planning group in the AOC database was par-
tially compensated by reporting by the therapist group, albeit at
a later day than when the delays were potentially known to be
imminent to the planning team. The planning delay issues were
typically identified and reported instead during the routine pre-
treatment audit of plans in the EMR 2 days prior to treatment ini-
tiation conducted by therapists in our department, when expected
documentation was determined to be incomplete or missing in
the EMR.
Treatment-planning delays (some of which lead to treat-
ment delays) are attributed to planning procedural delays (58%),
plan verification delays (23%), environmental issues (10%),
coordination-of-care with other caregivers (5%), and patient fac-
tors (4%) (Table 2). Most of the planning procedural delays
resulted from the need for additional information, issues with
image fusion, modifications in contours or prescriptions and
coordination, and scheduling. Safety incidents are attributed to
discrepancies in the EMR (33%), missing approvals (15%), patient
set-up issues (12%), on-treatment check delays or defects (11%),
variances (11%), missing documents (8%), patient and staff inci-
dents related to falls, collisions (10%) (Table 3). The variance
rate per patient was under 0.5% while the serious error rate was
under 0.01%.
FAILURE-MODE-AND-EFFECT-ANALYSIS
Based on the Landis-Koch criteria (32), Kappa-scores for severity-
risks (0.533) and detectability risks (0.629) were fair or good for the
highest risk-processes but poor for the likelihood-of-occurrence
Table 1 | Grading scheme used for FMEA exercise.
Severity of effect Occurrence rating Detection
Little to no effect None Very low: once in 6 years or 1/18,000 quality checklists (QCLs) Almost certain
Very minor Very low: once in 3 years or 1/9000 QCLs Very high
Inconvenience Minor Low: once a year or 1/3000 QCLs High
Very low Moderately low: once a year or 1/1500 QCLs Moderate high
Loss or degradation of
secondary function
Low Moderate: once a quarter or 1/750 QCLs Moderate
Moderate Moderately high: once a month or 1/250 QCLs Low
Loss or degradation of
primary function
High High once a fortnight or 1/120 QCLs Very low
Very high High: once a week or 1/40 QCLs Remote
Major Hazardous with warning Very high: once a day or 1/15 QCLs Very remote
Hazardous w/o warning Very high: more than once a day or 1/5 QCLs Almost impossible
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Table 2 | Factors contributing toward treatment-planning delays or treatment delays as reported and analyzed based on our incident-reporting
and analysis system.
Treatment-planning and treatment delays
PLANNING PROCEDURE DELAYS (58%)
Contour or prescription delays: additional information needed (previous RT treatment, additional images, MD peer review, new diagnostic workup or
findings, pathology reviews), case complexity, late image import into TPS, management (MD availability and handoffs), re-contouring, delinquency
Plan delay: insufficient time for planning (case complexity, physics coordination, delay-rush processes), plan modifications (plan deliverability issues on
Linac, prescription or constraint modifications, modality change, re-contouring), problems with plans (protocol requirements not achieved, inconsistent
with directives), management (planner availability and handoffs), delinquency
Modifications to previous SIM required: fit or placement of treatment aid inadequate, changes in patient anatomy (surgical procedures, device
implants), images unacceptable for treatment-planning (artifacts, anatomical coverage), patient preparation inadequate (bladder, rectal filling)
PLAN VERIFICATION DELAYS (23%)
Second Physics checks: fields not approved in EMR, IMRT QA delays or issues, plan documents not in EMR, problems identified with plans, physics
coordination
Problems noted by therapists in V-SIM checks: problems identified with plans (ambiguous plans in EMR, dose mismatch error, incorrect DRRs,
incorrect field size, delinquent patient accessory requests), plan deliverability issues, pre-treatment repeat CT required, treatment machine issues,
missing approvals
ENVIRONMENT (10%)
Informatics issues (problems with EMR, network communications issues, PACS, TPS), scheduling, and coordination of appointments; weather related
issues
COORDINATION-OF-CARE WITH NON RT MDS (5%)
Other procedures or MD availability: chemotherapy, admittance to hospital, blood work, dental work, erbitux therapy, heart monitoring, infection
treatment, medical oncology appointments, other exams needed, neurosurgeon availability
Additional information presented: pathology reports, protocol screening, surgical consultation, tumor rounds, biopsy, laboratory tests, further diagnostic
workup results
PATIENT FACTORS LEADINGTO DELAYS (4%)
Patient not amenable to/compliant with RT procedures, receiving treatment for other health/medical problems, scheduling unsatisfactory or required
change, transportation issues, personal factors, obtaining second opinions, declined MRI, debilitation, deteriorating medical conditions
SIMULATION DELAY (1%)
Simulation stopping events, image quality problems
Numbers in parentheses correspond to the percentage of cases for each sub-category.
risk (0.140). The highest RPN based on this exercise was 127
with all participant responses considered and 151 when responses
for specific process steps were limited to those who routinely
performed them.
The procedures with the highest severity-risks and RPNs
included contours, prescription, treatment plan completion, and
transfer to the EMR, MD plan approvals, IMRT QA, second physics
checks, pathology review, patient consent, laterality, and first day
physics checks (Figures 1 and 2).
BASELINE RISK PROFILE
A baseline review of metadata extracted from our EMR indicated
that approximately 40% of all the high-risk procedures identified
on the FMEA were completed with delays (Figure 3). In particular,
70% of contours and plan completion procedures were delayed.
Approximately 39% of all cases presented at pre-treatment-
planning peer review rounds presented with issues that required
contour completion, modification, or directive changes (Figure 4).
Latent risk factors that contributed to these included communica-
tion, procedural compliance, and time pressures (Tables 2 and 3).
The latent risk factors created an environment where upstream
high-risk procedures were delayed, but the overarching tendency
to treat on time necessitated a hastened completion of downstream
high-risk tasks. The net effect of the latent risk factors was the
prevalence of a local delay-rushed culture (Figure 5) incompatible
with patient safety goals.
Substantial variability in execution of high-risk procedures
was noted amongst staff as illustrated by the structure-process-
outcomes chart (Figure 6). Patient treatment volume was chosen
as an indicator for structure (17, 33, 34). Three of the 10 radia-
tion oncologists who collectively carried 36% of the department
patient volume were associated with 50% of the department
contour delays and 65% of the issues (contour modification
or inconsistent directives) identified at pre-treatment-planning
peer reviews, 52% of all reports logged in the AOC database,
56% of treatment delays, 55% of all safety incidents, and 46%
of department variances; thus more than their volume share
would predict. In contrast one radiation oncologist who car-
ried 18% of the department volume had 4% of the depart-
ment contour delays, 3% of the peer review issues, 12% of all
AOC reports, 9% of all treatment delays, 14% of all safety inci-
dents, and 18% of department variances; well below or at par
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Table 3 | Factors contributing toward either preventive (good catches/near misses) or reactive findings as reported and analyzed based on our
incident-reporting and analysis system.
Safety events: preventive and reactive
DISCREPANCY IN EMR (33%)
Dose tracking per field inconsistent with Rx, field, or DRR name mismatch, incorrect DRRs, field parameter mismatch (gantry, collimator, couch angles,
fields swapped, monitor units), prescription mismatch, accessory mismatch, incorrect field size, incorrect beam energy, incorrect treatment time set-up
in fields, documents for a different patient, treatment plan issues (bolus, dose computation inconsistent with prescription, images not fused, incorrect
accessory factor, MLC settings, overlap with previously treated fields, plan inconsistent with directive, treatment plan for different linear accelerator
plan inconsistent with simulation set-up notes), field parameters changed inadvertently on first day physics check, field size changes following system
upgrade
MISSINGTREATMENT APPROVALS IN EMR (15%)
Physician approvals (prescription, treatment plan, pathology review documentation), physics approvals (IMRT QA documentation, treatment fields,
second check approval of treatment plan, planner approval of treatment plan), multiple approvals missing, second physics check approval completed
prior to field parameter entry completion, incomplete quality checklist tasks
PATIENT SET-UP (12%)
Port film issues, machine clearance issues, insufficient field coverage, difficulties with treatment aids/devices, incorrect treatment device fabrication,
missing devices, Vac-loc bag deflation, incorrect localization methodology, set-up difficulties due to changes in patient anatomy or preparation, patients
could not tolerate set-up
ON-TREATMENT CHECKS DELAYED/MISSING/INCORRECT (11%)
Patient in vivo (nanodot) measurements not documented in EMR, first day physics check delayed, not documented or documented prior to first day
treatment, weekly physics chart check note missing, quality checklists (e.g., laterality) not completed
VARIANCE (INCORRECT DOSE DELIVERED, INCORRECT VOLUME IRRADIATED OR BOTH) (11%)
Incorrect treatment field used (handoff), not all treatment fields delivered (fields hidden), incorrect shifts applied (handoff), bolus not used, incorrect
gantry angle used (override, wide tolerance tables, communication between EMR and Linac communications), incorrect fractionation delivered
(treatment calendar), incorrect block used (text overlay on DRR), incorrect monitor units (incorrect use of MU calculation sheet, missing physics check,
tray factor), incorrect collimator angles, partial treatment delivered (machine limitations, EMR and Linac communications), incorrect energy used,
incorrect couch angle, incorrect accessory used, incorrect field size (inadvertent asymmetric to symmetric setting change on first day physics check),
IGRT localization data for different patient used, incorrect fiducial markers used, pacemaker patient received one treatment without rhythm strip,
patient simulated without physician documentation in EMR, incorrect SSD (override), field block by couch top
MISSING/INCORRECT DOCUMENTS IN EMR (8%)
Pathology report missing prior to V-SIM, pacemaker alert and/or dosimetry information missing, IMRT QA report missing, treatment plan missing,
insurance authorization documents missing, patient identification documents missing, consultation documents missing, second physics check
document missing
PATIENT INCIDENT (7%)
Fall/slippage/collision, rapid response or emergency procedures unrelated to radiation therapy (breathing, O2 saturation drop, blood pressure), injury
(procedural complications – applicator insertion or removal, removal of ekg lead, removal of HDR unit prior to removing catheter), coordination-of-care
(pre-operative radiation delivered for subsequently delayed surgery)
STAFF INCIDENT (3%)
Fall/slippage/collision; injury while assisting patient, exposure to bodily fluids or matter, electrical shock (field engineer)
with the treatment volume share. For the remaining radiation
oncologists process delays or peer review issues and AOC effects
were at par with or less than total department shares of patient
volumes.
RISK-MITIGATION STRATEGIES AND THEIR IMPACT
Analysis of the AOC database, FMEA, and baseline risk pro-
file resulted in six risk-mitigation initiatives to minimize process
delays, defects, and variability amongst staff. These were standard-
ization of care pathways (35) and toxicity grading (36) to reduce
the severity risk; pre-treatment-planning peer review rounds (37),
and a no-fly-policy (38) to reduce the likelihood-of-occurrence
and detectability risks; an electronic whiteboard (39) as a process
mapping and error detection tool to enhance communications,
reduce detectability risks, and augment the AOC database; and
the use of six sigma metrics to gage operational efficiencies in the
context of timely completions and reduced variability (13).
The respective metrics used to gage effectiveness were
compliance-with-directive usage, kappa-scores for inter-rater reli-
ability of toxicity grading schemes, fraction of cases presented at
pre-treatment-planning peer review rounds with no issues, proac-
tive and no-fly treatment delay rates, incident-reporting rates and
high-risk-process task delay rates, or Z -scores.
There has been a sustained rate of improvement across all met-
rics evaluated over the past 3 years. The compliance with the use
of care pathways has steadily increased to 97%. Inter-rater relia-
bility for toxicity grading has improved by a factor of two using
kappa statistics. Defect rates in timely completion of high-risk
tasks have dropped steadily from 39 to 20% (Figure 3). The per-
centage of cases presented at pre-treatment-planning peer review
www.frontiersin.org December 2013 | Volume 3 | Article 305 | 5
Kapur et al. Safety initiatives in radiation medicine
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
2
n
d
 P
la
n
 C
h
e
c
k
 
P
la
n
 C
o
m
p
le
te
d
 
P
t 
Id
e
n
ti
fi
c
a
ti
o
n
 
IM
R
T
 Q
A
 
L
a
te
ra
lit
y
 
L
a
te
ra
lit
y
  
S
IM
: 
ID
 P
h
o
to
 
U
p
lo
a
d
 t
o
 I
M
P
A
C
 
T
X
: 
P
re
s
c
ri
p
ti
o
n
 
1
s
t 
D
a
y
 P
h
y
s
ic
 C
h
e
c
k
 
C
o
n
to
u
r 
P
a
th
 S
lid
e
 R
e
c
d
 
S
IM
: 
F
ie
ld
 P
h
o
to
 
P
a
th
 R
e
v
ie
w
e
d
 
C
o
m
p
le
te
 S
im
 S
h
e
e
t 
M
D
 A
p
p
ro
v
e
 P
la
n
 
P
la
n
 L
o
c
k
e
d
 
C
h
e
c
k
 P
la
n
 A
p
p
ro
v
a
ls
 
T
x
 C
o
n
s
e
n
t 
P
a
th
 R
e
v
ie
w
e
d
 
P
a
th
 r
e
q
u
e
s
te
d
 
F
ie
ld
 I
n
fo
 E
n
te
re
d
 
N
u
rs
in
g
 A
s
s
e
s
s
m
e
n
t 
C
h
e
c
k
 C
o
n
s
e
n
t 
C
h
a
rt
 R
o
u
n
d
s
 
S
im
 C
h
a
rt
 C
h
e
c
k
 
P
o
rt
a
l 
v
is
io
n
 
D
e
m
o
g
ra
p
h
ic
s
  
R
e
q
u
e
s
t 
F
u
s
io
n
 
O
b
ta
in
 r
e
c
o
rd
s
  
 
T
re
a
tm
e
n
t 
D
e
v
ic
e
s
 
T
X
: 
P
re
s
c
ri
p
ti
o
n
  
D
E
L
A
Y
N
o
te
 (
M
D
) 
2
n
d
 P
la
n
 C
h
e
c
k
  
D
E
L
A
Y
IM
R
T
 Q
A
  
D
E
L
A
Y
P
la
n
 C
o
m
p
le
te
d
  
D
E
L
A
Y
P
h
y
s
 P
la
n
 R
e
q
u
e
s
t 
to
 P
H
C
 
P
a
th
 S
lid
e
 R
e
c
d
  
D
E
L
A
Y
O
b
ta
in
 r
e
c
o
rd
s
  
D
E
L
A
Y
C
o
n
to
u
r 
 D
E
L
A
Y
M
D
 A
p
p
ro
v
e
 P
la
n
  
D
E
L
A
Y
F
in
a
l 
P
h
y
s
ic
s
 C
h
e
c
k
 
R
N
 E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
 
R
e
q
u
e
s
t 
F
u
s
io
n
  
D
E
L
A
Y
T
ra
n
s
c
ri
p
ti
o
n
 D
ic
ta
t 
S
c
h
e
d
u
le
 P
T
E
 
P
a
th
 r
e
q
u
e
s
te
d
  
D
E
L
A
Y
R
e
v
ie
w
 S
W
 R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
S
c
re
e
n
 f
o
r 
P
ro
to
c
o
l 
D
is
c
h
a
rg
e
 I
n
s
t 
T
ra
n
s
c
ri
p
ti
o
n
 D
o
n
e
 
T
re
a
tm
e
n
t 
S
u
m
m
a
ry
 
S
im
 C
h
a
rt
 C
h
e
c
k
  
D
E
L
A
Y
R
e
v
ie
w
 N
u
tr
 R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
S
c
re
e
n
 f
o
r 
P
ro
to
c
o
l 
 D
E
L
A
Y
In
s
u
ra
n
c
e
 A
u
th
 
H
C
P
 F
o
rm
s
  
In
s
u
ra
n
c
e
 I
n
fo
 
U
p
d
a
te
 M
D
 D
ir
e
c
to
ry
 
S
p
e
c
ia
l 
T
x
 p
ro
c
 
P
h
y
s
ic
s
 C
o
n
s
u
lt
 F
o
rm
 
F
in
a
l 
C
h
a
rg
e
 A
u
d
it
 
C
h
a
n
g
e
 S
ta
tu
s
 
H
IP
A
A
 F
o
rm
s
 
W
e
 C
A
R
E
 w
a
te
r 
b
o
tt
le
 
R
IS
K
 L
E
V
E
L
FMEA: RADIATION MEDICINE PROCESS STEPS
Severity Likelihood of Occurrence Detectability
FIGURE 1 | Decomposition of our process-map in radiation medicine into three components of risk levels based on prospective failure-mode analysis.
rounds with no defects identified has increased from 61 to 70%
in the first 6 months of its implementation (Figure 4). Current
defect detection rates for contours and care pathways are approx-
imately 7 and 9% respectively of patients presented at rounds.
Proactive and no-fly delay rates have dropped from 12 to 8% of
all new patient starts (Figure 7). Incident-reporting in the white-
board by the treatment-planning team has increased more than
three times in 9 months of usage relative to 6 years of usage of
the AOC database with no increase in the observation of adverse
events. Operational Z -scores have improved from 1.78 to 2.35.
DISCUSSION
Moving toward safer radiotherapy practice requires an active
surveillance of associated failures, their causes and effects, and
evidence-based approaches to mitigate them. Surveillance may
be conducted reactively, such as via the analysis of incidents
reported at any given institution, in multi-institutional data-
bases or published reports (1, 27–29, 40–54). Alternatively, it
may be conducted proactively using probabilistic safety assess-
ment tools, risk matrices, or failure-mode-and-effect analysis (29,
55–60). Understanding the nature, cause and effects of errors
in radiation medicine is confounded by the involvement of
human or cultural factors and their interactions with systems
(30, 61), varying human perceptions during incident-reporting
and analysis (62), under-reporting, or skewed reporting of inci-
dents amongst functional groups (3), and practical limitations
of anticipating all possible trajectories for failure propagation in
complex systems (22). This is partially illustrated in one recent
study, where it was shown that a large fraction (42%) of inci-
dents reported were not predicted by the FMEA conducted at
the same institution (3) and is likely to be true for other studies
including ours.
From a practical perspective, what neither reactive nor proac-
tive surveillance approaches can do independently is reveal all
underlying causes of specific effects observed or all possible adverse
effects of specific causes (22). Much may be learned then from the
combined surveillance approach. Using probabilistic safety assess-
ment tools on 443 failure-modes, a multidisciplinary task group of
the Ibero American FORO of Nuclear and radiation safety agen-
cies have shown that 90% of potentially catastrophic accidental
exposures involving multiple patients could be attributed to as
few as eight event sequences with misunderstanding of delineated
treatment volumes, initial treatment sessions, patient positioning,
treatment delivery, and treatment-planning being the most vulner-
able steps in the process (29, 56). Continued incident-reporting on
a national or international level may reveal a similar cluster of risk-
heightened sequences and therefore direct mitigation strategies
more effectively.
A limitation that affects both forms of surveillance is that of
the differences in perception by staff members. The same incident
report could be interpreted differently by different staff members
analyzing the report. This in turn has important consequences
on incident learning or relative risk assessment and therefore
the legitimacy or effectiveness of resulting corrective actions. The
Frontiers in Oncology | Radiation Oncology December 2013 | Volume 3 | Article 305 | 6
Kapur et al. Safety initiatives in radiation medicine
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
1
s
t 
D
a
y
 P
h
y
s
ic
 C
h
e
c
k
 
C
o
n
to
u
r 
 D
E
L
A
Y
2
n
d
 P
la
n
 C
h
e
c
k
 
C
o
n
to
u
r 
IM
R
T
 Q
A
 
P
la
n
 C
o
m
p
le
te
d
 
P
la
n
 L
o
c
k
e
d
 
P
a
th
 R
e
v
ie
w
e
d
 
P
h
y
s
 P
la
n
 R
e
q
u
e
s
t 
to
 P
H
C
 
P
la
n
 C
o
m
p
le
te
d
  
D
E
L
A
Y
U
p
lo
a
d
 t
o
 I
M
P
A
C
 
T
X
: 
P
re
s
c
ri
p
ti
o
n
 
C
h
a
rt
 R
o
u
n
d
s
 
P
a
th
 R
e
v
ie
w
e
d
 
M
D
 A
p
p
ro
v
e
 P
la
n
 
IM
R
T
 Q
A
  
D
E
L
A
Y
S
im
 C
h
a
rt
 C
h
e
c
k
 
O
b
ta
in
 r
e
c
o
rd
s
  
 
2
n
d
 P
la
n
 C
h
e
c
k
  
D
E
L
A
Y
N
o
te
 (
M
D
) 
O
b
ta
in
 r
e
c
o
rd
s
  
D
E
L
A
Y
R
e
v
ie
w
 N
u
tr
 R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
C
h
e
c
k
 P
la
n
 A
p
p
ro
v
a
ls
 
T
X
: 
P
re
s
c
ri
p
ti
o
n
  
D
E
L
A
Y
P
o
rt
a
l 
v
is
io
n
 
T
re
a
tm
e
n
t 
D
e
v
ic
e
s
 
P
a
th
 r
e
q
u
e
s
te
d
 
L
a
te
ra
lit
y
 
L
a
te
ra
lit
y
  
R
e
q
u
e
s
t 
F
u
s
io
n
 
M
D
 A
p
p
ro
v
e
 P
la
n
  
D
E
L
A
Y
F
in
a
l 
P
h
y
s
ic
s
 C
h
e
c
k
 
R
N
 E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
 
D
e
m
o
g
ra
p
h
ic
s
  
N
u
rs
in
g
 A
s
s
e
s
s
m
e
n
t 
P
a
th
 S
lid
e
 R
e
c
d
  
D
E
L
A
Y
T
x 
C
o
n
s
e
n
t 
P
a
th
 S
lid
e
 R
e
c
d
 
F
ie
ld
 I
n
fo
 E
n
te
re
d
 
T
ra
n
s
c
ri
p
ti
o
n
 D
ic
ta
t 
In
s
u
ra
n
c
e
 A
u
th
 
R
e
q
u
e
s
t 
F
u
s
io
n
  
D
E
L
A
Y
T
ra
n
s
c
ri
p
ti
o
n
 D
o
n
e
 
C
o
m
p
le
te
 S
im
 S
h
e
e
t 
S
IM
: 
F
ie
ld
 P
h
o
to
 
D
is
c
h
a
rg
e
 I
n
s
t 
T
re
a
tm
e
n
t 
S
u
m
m
a
ry
 
P
a
th
 r
e
q
u
e
s
te
d
  
D
E
L
A
Y
S
IM
: 
ID
 P
h
o
to
 
S
c
h
e
d
u
le
 P
T
E
 
C
h
e
c
k
 C
o
n
s
e
n
t 
S
im
 C
h
a
rt
 C
h
e
c
k
  
D
E
L
A
Y
R
e
v
ie
w
 S
W
 R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
U
p
d
a
te
 M
D
 D
ir
e
c
to
ry
 
H
C
P
 F
o
rm
s
  
P
t 
Id
e
n
ti
fi
c
a
ti
o
n
 
S
p
e
c
ia
l 
T
x 
p
ro
c
 
C
h
a
n
g
e
 S
ta
tu
s
 
S
c
re
e
n
 f
o
r 
P
ro
to
c
o
l 
 D
E
L
A
Y
P
h
y
s
ic
s
 C
o
n
s
u
lt
 F
o
rm
 
H
IP
A
A
 F
o
rm
s
 
S
c
re
e
n
 f
o
r 
P
ro
to
c
o
l 
W
e
 C
A
R
E
 w
a
te
r 
b
o
tt
le
 
F
in
a
l 
C
h
a
rg
e
 A
u
d
it
 
R
P
N
PROCESS MAP RISK PRIORITY NUMBER (RPN)
(Severity Risk) X (Occurrence Risk) X (Detectability Risk)
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difference in perception was exemplified when the kappa-scores
for consistency in analysis of a set of test cases from our AOC
database amongst members of the QM team (typically at 0.837)
dropped with the addition of a new team member (to 0.747), and
by the low kappa score (0.140) for the likelihood-of-occurrence
risks for the high-severity risk tasks during the FMEA exercise.
This emphasized the need for the continual assessment of inter-
rater reliability in the use and development of taxonomies for
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incident learning. In regard to the FMEA, there was a wider vari-
ation in perceptual differences for the likelihood-of-occurrence
assessments for two reasons. First, the FMEA was conducted by
members across all functional groups and thus some of the failure-
modes for a particular type of procedure were less understood
by or familiar to those who did not routinely perform them. As
errors started by one professional group however are often caught
by another (63), an observation exemplified several times in our
AOC database, the group perspective was an important step in
determining and assessing various modes of procedural failures.
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FIGURE 4 | Mitigation of defects increased process control for
high-risk-process steps (contours and prescription in care pathways)
over time.
Second, many of the failure-modes identified were hypothetical in
nature, and thus the estimation of their likelihood-of-occurrence
with existing controls in place was subject to individual percep-
tion bias. To reduce the effects of these limitations, RPN scores
were also calculated by restricting the likelihood-of-occurrence
risks to those who routinely performed the procedures and by
finding ways to measure actual defect rates by querying the EMR
directly where possible. The scales used for FMEA are ordinal
scales and are subject therefore to rater perception. The RPN
computation is thus somewhat flawed as it involves the mul-
tiplication of grades based on ordinal data. Hence our assess-
ment of the risk profile for the various process steps during the
FMEA was based on collective consideration of the severity-risks
and the semi-quantitative RPN scores rather than on the latter
alone.
Despite the limitations of failure analyses mentioned above, the
use of various incident-reporting systems, differing taxonomies,
and FMEA study designs (including grading schemes used) at
different institutions, in comparing our findings (Figures 1 and
2; Tables 2 and 3) with those of others referenced above, we
have noted several similarities for the types of incidents observed,
the causal relationships and the process steps where high-risk
sub-steps appear to be clustered. Incident learning and FMEA
studies at our institution have shown us that failures occur due to
delays in the completion of the radiation medicine process steps
or defects relative to standard-operating-procedures in key steps
Standard Process
Rx Contour Plan Review Export QA
2nd
Check
Simula on Treatment
Delay-Rushed Process
Rx Contour Plan Review Export QA
2nd
Check
Simula on Treatment
No-Fly Process
Rx Contour Review Export QA
2nd
Check
Simula on Treatment
Plan
- -
FIGURE 5 | Delay-rushed processes. On the upper panel is a
qualitative plot of a nominal timeline for task completions – the width
of each block corresponding to the time needed for each task. Not
changing the expected treatment date, in the event of upstream task
delays, would require shortening the time for completion of the
downstream tasks (middle panel) and thus exacerbated time pressures
that could lead to errors. On the other hand, extending the treatment
date proactively to account for the upstream task delay would restore
the downstream timelines (bottom panel) and a “treat safely” first
culture.
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along the way and that the nature of process execution is depen-
dent on the structural set-up of the department and coordination
with other caregivers or the patients themselves. There were three
main contributors to failures including treatment delays and safety
findings in our database.
The first was the timeliness and accuracy of the execution of
high-risk-process steps identified in our FMEA. In particular, con-
tours, prescription, the completion of the treatment plan and
second checks are complex in nature, requiring many inter-related
subtasks, pre-requisite information, and handoffs, and have a
tight coupling with observed treatment delays or safety incidents
(Tables 2 and 3) (31, 64). Delays and defects in completing these
tasks are attributed not just to staff delinquencies but to a large
extent also the need for obtaining the requisite information at the
right time from the right source. Structural barriers to this include
inadequate procedural training or skills, ineffective handoffs or
communications, improper scheduling or coordination of staff
and equipment failures. For approximately 40% of the variances
noted in our system, the errors were determined to have germi-
nated at various stages of the treatment-planning preparation,
clustered around these tasks. Thus despite multiple defenses-in-
depth serving as quality control checkpoints (plan reviews, sec-
ond physics checks, verification simulation, timeouts, and initial
treatment checks), quality was not fully assured and errors were
allowed to propagate. Second, our review of the structure-process-
outcomes metrics highlights variability in practice amongst our
radiation oncologists (Figure 6). A similar trend was noted for
planners and physicists. As with the limited cluster of high-risk-
process steps, the propensity toward risk is elevated for a handful
of the staff where high-risk task delays and defects as well as
patient effects noted in the AOC database were exacerbated rel-
ative to others despite no significant differences in their share of
patient volumes, case complexity or urgency. Finally, cultural ten-
dencies to prioritize time pressures for treatment initiation elevate
the risk profile by creating local traps and recurrent patterns for
delay-rushed practices and thus error-provoking conditions. Prior
to 2010 75% of treatment-planning delays in the high-risk steps
did not culminate in treatment delays – this dropped by a fac-
tor of two in the transition phase leading to the initiation of the
no-fly-policy. Multiple incidents were reported with incomplete
high–risk procedures while the patient was awaiting treatment
initiation, suggesting the site culture somehow supported delay-
rushed practices instead of focusing on proactively addressing
underlying systemic deficiencies. Thus high-risk task delays or
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defects, staff variability and delay-rushed tendencies were the three
main error-provoking factors in our study.
Risk-mitigation was therefore geared toward these three fac-
tors, using the mitigation strategies of the FMEA process – namely
reduction of associated severity metrics, likelihood-of-occurrence
and the likelihood of detection of errors if these occurred. The
main focus was on building robustness within our radiation
medicine process with the awareness that it may be formida-
ble to completely eliminate failures (65) but that we may be
better oriented to contain their damaging effects by injecting
quality control and assurance measures between consultation
and completion of planning stages and enhancing defenses-in-
depth (66).
Mitigation of the severity risk was approached by enhanc-
ing standardization of care pathways and the grading of adverse
effects. Non-compliance with treatment protocols and variabil-
ity in practice has been shown to lead to inferior outcomes (67,
68). To avoid ad hoc care, we instituted detailed evidence-based
treatment pathways that encompassed all domains of care includ-
ing prescription, simulation, planning, nursing interventions and
follow-up assessments (35). These were based on the Institute of
Medicine, and quantitative analysis of normal tissue effects in
the clinic (QUANTEC) guidelines (4). In order to ensure that
patients would be evaluated for toxicities in a standardized way
regardless of caregiver (69, 70), we incorporated the Common
Terminology Criteria for Adverse Effects (CTCAE V4.0) grading
scheme from the National Cancer Institute into our EMR (36,
71). These initiatives were aimed toward reducing defects in the
completion of high-risk tasks due to care based on individual care-
giver experience rather than published evidence. Incorporating the
standards into the EMR provided us with a baseline reference with
which to compare pathways chosen for specific patients and thus
a means to detect and assess differences and reduce variability in
practice.
To reduce the likelihood-of-occurrence and detection risks,
three initiatives were introduced. Pre-treatment-planning peer
reviews were instituted on a daily basis with all faculty, treatment-
planning and scheduling team members to review patient charts
prior to the initiation of treatment-planning (37). Similar rounds
at other institutions demonstrate the value added by peer review
(72). The goal was to detect errors in the care pathways as well as
contours delineated in the treatment-planning systems for specific
patients. The standardized care pathways were based on all faculty
inputs and thus provided a framework for managing potentially
contentious discussions during rounds as well as exploring oppor-
tunities for improvement based on new published evidence in the
literature. The rounds served as a checkpoint for the initiation
of treatment-planning so that planning would commence after
reconciliation of identified defects.
Coordination-of-care amongst caregivers was enhanced by the
creation of an electronic whiteboard that was used for peer rounds
and for efficiently coordinating all treatment-planning tasks for
all patients at all sites of the department in a more transparent
manner than what was available in the EMR (39). Traditionally
staff members were accustomed to mainly reviewing QCL items
assigned just to them in the EMR. This reduced simultaneous
awareness of gaps in the planning process by others. With the
whiteboard, alerts for potential delays in all high-risk planning
tasks for specific patients were made more obvious to all mem-
bers of the planning team without the need for additional mouse
clicks.
Given the paucity of reports in the AOC database by mem-
bers of the planning team, the whiteboard additionally served
as a platform to report errors identified on peer rounds as each
case was reviewed. A substantial increase in incident-reporting
resulted from the use of the whiteboard as an augment to the
AOC database. This does not reflect an increase necessarily in
the incidence of events, rather the increase in the reporting of
these events. It has been reported that departments that regis-
ter more events in such systems actually have fewer events that
lead to patient harm (3, 73). Three factors contributed toward
this improvement. First, the electronic whiteboard was used as an
operational tool to navigate daily pre-treatment-planning rounds
where all staff members involved in the plans of all patients
being reviewed on a certain day were present. In addition to
navigating rounds, its immediate access during rounds provided
an efficient interface to summarize the review for each patient
and also to register issues. Second, the reporting interface within
the whiteboard was simpler to use as it did not require onerous
and duplicitous data entry such as patient demographic infor-
mation or associated data, since this data was already available.
Thus the overhead in reporting was substantially reduced com-
pared to the AOC database. This enhanced reporting efficiency
not just during rounds, but at all times. For planning staff mem-
bers, selecting a drop-down entry in an already open electronic
whiteboard was less of a barrier to reporting than the need to sep-
arately open the AOC database and complete all entries. Third,
any event identified during pre-treatment-planning rounds was
required to be logged with all planning staff present. This require-
ment served as a forcing function for staff members to complete
event entries.
Defect rates as well as delay rates of all procedures were gaged
using Z -scores – a standard practice in high reliability indus-
tries (13). These metrics were computed previously with metadata
from the EMR but are now routinely computed with data from
the whiteboard. Z -scores for all high-risk tasks were routinely
reported to all staff members at monthly QM meetings using con-
trol charts so as to increase awareness of underlying issues and
highlight individual staff operational performance improvement
needs. The Z -score combines the accuracy with which tasks are
completed based on specification limits as well as the variabil-
ity in task completion. The use of the Z -score has provided a
means of evaluating our progress in the same framework used
by high reliability industries that strive toward six sigma levels of
operations.
Finally to mitigate risks associated with rushed completions of
high-risk tasks, we implemented a “No-fly-policy” with stopping
rules that proactively delayed patient treatment starts or prevented
treatment starts in the event such delay-rushed processes would
have occurred (38). Overall, there has been a steady trend showing
a drop in high-risk task delays as well as a drop in patient treat-
ment initiation delays. The policy provides a robust mechanism to
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mitigate potentially unsafe treatment starts regardless of variability
in high-risk task completions or staff performance. It has trans-
formed the culture from “treat on time” first to “treat safely” first.
An oft quoted goal in radiation medicine is to deliver the right
dose to the right target while minimizing dose to organs at risk.
Much has been done by way of algorithm or technique develop-
ment toward meeting that goal, but little in terms of addressing
comprehensive structure-process-outcome deficiencies. Given our
baseline risk profile (likely similar to that for other departments),
we felt we needed more than a set of policies or checklists in
order to transform our culture to one that was actively focused
on safety. Driving these risk-mitigation initiatives has challenged
traditional norms of operations such as expediting treatment ini-
tiation in delay-rushed environments or sustaining care pathways
that are more experience based than evidence-based. Therefore
their implementation has met with substantial cultural barriers
for adoption. Working practices evolve over decades, and chang-
ing them with such initiatives creates uncertainty. The inertia of
sustaining past cultures and arguments for not changing tend to
perseverate (74). Direct persuasion only goes so far (75). In antic-
ipation of these barriers, our initiatives were not implemented
abruptly,but via transitional phases focused on staff feedback,edu-
cation, training, and communication (76). The goal was to intro-
duce them in a manner that would support the staff to embrace
the measures by the time of formal implementation. Regardless of
the barriers, our focus on patient safety, combined with statistical
process control, regular event database reviews and staff meetings,
and use of quantitative metrics that has been instrumental in real-
izing these changes and crossing barriers. We have seen sustained
improvements over the past 3 years of implementation in our
department. Institution of the following items has helped drive our
department toward improvements in patient safety: (i) standard-
ization of treatment care pathways, (ii) standardization of toxicity
grading, (iii) institution of prospective pre-treatment-planning
peer reviews, (iv) process management for treatment-planning
components, (v) assessment of operational efficiencies, and (vi)
enforcement of the No-Fly-Policy. We believe that most centers
can augment their safety programs by complying with and insti-
tuting some or all of these initiatives. By doing so, they can use the
work from this study to build a culture of safety without necessar-
ily replicating the more time-consuming aspects of the study. Yet,
for others, there is value in validating our results.
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